






Product differentiation and vertical integration  


















Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2009/70 
 
Product differentiation and vertical integration  










In this paper, we present a model of endogenous vertical integration and horizontal differentiation. There 
exists two output brands and two versions of the input. The only mean for output differentiation is the input 
version  used  in  output  production.  Firms  may  choose  to  vertically  integrate  to  produce  internally  the 
required input version at marginal cost, rather then to buy it at the market price, if that version is made 
available.  We  show  that  vertical  mergers  increase  the  possibility  that  output  goods  are  differentiated. 
Moreover, this occurs when the cost to differentiate the input is high. On the other hand, vertical integration 
is detrimental for brand variety if the cost to differentiate inputs is negligible. 
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This paper studies the eect of vertical mergers in a two layer industry with hor-
izontally dierentiated input and outputs. The only mean through which down-
stream rms may dierentiate their brands is the input version used to produce
output (Belleamme and Toulemonde, 2003 or Gabszewicz and Turrini, 1998).
This suggests that the decision of upstream rms on input dierentiation af-
fects the decision of downstream rms on output dierentiation and vice versa1.
Examples of this occurrence abound in the electronic and computer industries
where the choice of software companies (upstream rms) as to what applica-
tion to produce aects the type of hardware selected by hardware companies
(downstream rms). Similarly, economic outlets have recently reported that a
majority of economic activities in US is "project oriented" (Pepall and Norman,
2001). These projects combine the work of traditional employees, workers under
contract and consultants, working into a team. When the project is realized the
team breaks down, and each participant engages in new projects. The team can
be viewed as an input to realize a specic objective, which can be reached only
if the most appropriate team is constituted. A good example of such projects
activities is the TV series productions. Finally, empirical investigations report
that the quality of products depends signicantly on the degree of availability
of skilled workers (Gabszewicz and Turrini, 1998). Indeed, it is easy to imagine
a link between the available skills (input specication) and the feasible quality
(characteristics) of the nal good2.
The interdependence between the decision of input supplier and output pro-
ducers leads to dierent equilibrium structures characterized by dierent allo-
cations of rms on dierent brands (Belleamme and Toulemonde, 2003, Mat-
sushima 2004).
These examples share a further characteristic: input suppliers have exible
manufacturing production technologies. This implies that each input supplier
can potentially produce both types of input versions. Eaton and Schmitt (1994)
or Norman and Thisse (1999) nd that exible manufacturing promotes concen-
tration through mergers. Similarly, when exible manufacturing is introduced
in a two layer industry, vertical mergers may arise between upstream and down-
stream rms inducing anticompetitive eects on equilibrium prices (Church and
Gandal, 2000, Pepall and Norman, 2001).
In the context described above characterized by (i) inputs as the mean of
output dierentiation and (ii) exible technology for inputs, we investigate the
implications of endogenous vertical mergers on horizontal dierentiation of out-
put brands. Vertical integration has several eects on prots of merged rms
and of the unintegrated ones. Firstly, it allows internalizing the production of
input and consequently makes the entity independent from input suppliers deci-
1For instance, if all input suppliers choose to produce the same input version, this would
naturally lead to homogenous output goods. A less extreme distribution of input suppliers
among dierent input versions, opens the door to horizontal output dierentiation.
2This is an example of vertical dierentiation, while the other ones represent horizontal
dierentiation.
2sion. Secondly, merging can be protable in presence of double marginalization.
For instance, an industry where double marginalization is an issue is the cable
television in the US. In this industry, producers charge for programming per
subscriber, and this corresponds to a linear pricing. As it is well known, linear
pricing in multi layers, non competitive, industries leads to double marginal-
ization. Evidence in the U.S. market is consistent with the presence of double
marginalization (Waterman and Weiss, 1996, Belleamme and Peitz (forthcom-
ing)). Finally, the merged rm may increase the rival input cost by withdrawing
their participation in the input market (increasing rival costs' strategy)3.
We nd that allowing rms to vertically integrate expands the sets of pa-
rameters where output rms decide to dierentiate. Furthermore, the eects of
vertical agreements on horizontal dierentiation depend on the level of input
costs. When the cost to dierentiate the input is negligible, brands are dieren-
tiated if rms operate separately. As the cost to dierentiate inputs gets higher,
output brands are dierentiated if rms can vertically integrate.
The decisions of rms are modelled in a sequential game. In the rst stage,
two downstream rms choose their brand of output. In the second stage, rms
decide what is the structure of their rm: to integrate or not. In the third
stage, production of output and input takes place4. The timing of the game
reects the irreversibility of decisions. Thus, our model is suitable to situations
in which the choice of technology to produce the output is less reversible then
the decision to vertically integrate or not.
The literature on product variety generally agrees that variety should be
higher under vertical separation (K uhn and Vives (1999)). This is the case
when rms have already decided the brand to produce, and vertical integration
aects their survival in the market. Indeed, collusive agreements can bring
input foreclosure and determine the exit of rms, reducing variety. Instead,
in this model vertical integration helps brand dierentiation. The two results
are not contradictory. Indeed, we nd that when the input cost dierence
is not high, vertical integration does reduce dierentiation of brands. But,
we also nd that vertical mergers facilitate dierentiation when the input cost
dierence is high enough. Moreover, in presence of double marginalization, the
set where output dierentiation takes place is larger than the corresponding
set without vertical mergers. Finally, further works related to our paper are
for instance Choi and Yi (2000). Authors study the anticompetitive eects of
vertical integration with dierentiated outputs. In their model, upstream rms
should decide the specication of the input to produce, being able to produce
only one input version. Choi and Yi (2000) show how vertical integration can
be anticompetitive because input specication choice leads clearly to exclusion.
Pepall and Norman (2001) analyze successive Bertrand oligopolies considering
that downstream rms use Leontief technologies and the corresponding inputs
3In other setups, insightful analysis of equilibrium foreclosure have been proposed by Or-
dover, Saloner and Salop (1990), and Hart and Tirole (1990).
4We use successive oligopolies, because they are a natural setup to study the spill-overs
induced by the strategic behavior of rms in the upstream market on the behavior of rms in
the downstream market and vice versa.
3used are complementary. Our analysis departs from Pepall and Norman (2001)
because we make endogenous the choice of the brand for both input and output
rms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 deals with the equilibrium of the game. Section 4 studies the eects
of vertical integration of output dierentiation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Assume there exist two brands of output a and b. Two downstream rms D1
and D2 shall decide to produce one of the two goods by transforming the input
on a one-to-one basis. They can both decide to produce the same good i, i = a;b;
and face the following output demand
pi = 1   zi; i = a;b
where zi is the total amount produced of brand i: Alternatively, rms may
decide to dierentiate producing one brand a and the other brand b. The output
demands faced by the rms in this case are:
pa = 1   za   zb
pb = 1   za   zb
These demands are derived from the maximization problem of a representative
consumer with taste for variety (Singh and Vives, 1984) endowed with a utility









The parameter  measures the degree of product dierentiation between the two
brands in the downstream market. As  increases the products become more
similar5.
Consider also two upstream rms, denoted by U1 and U2, who produce
an homogeneous input with cost c that can be used in the production of good
a. Production of brand b requires a dierent version of the input that can be
produced possibly by each of the upstream rms sustaining an additional cost
t;t < 1: For simplicity normalize c to 0. Then, the cost t is the unit cost for
input dierentiation.
In the following, we develop a game of brand dierentiation and vertical in-
tegration. The game is composed of three stages: in the rst stage, rms decide
which good to produce; in the second, they decide to vertically integrate or not,
and in stage three the production of the goods takes place. A major advantage
of using this modeling is that vertical relationships between the upstream and
the downstream can be assessed purely in terms of the parameters  and t:
Consider the type of equilibria that may arise:
5When  = 1 the downstream products are perfect substitutes in consumption. In con-
trast, when  = 0 the products are completely dierentiated. In this case, each rm in the
downstream market is a single-product monopolist.
4 If each downstream rm chooses a dierent brand, (i) none of the rms
may merge; (ii) the rms can both decide to integrate with one upstream
rm - full integration; or (iii) only one of the downstream rms merges
with one upstream rm while the other couple of rms operates separately.
 If both downstream rms decide to produce the same brand we again may
have (i), (ii) or (iii) as equilibrium of the game.
We solve the game using backward induction.
2.1 Downstream rms dierentiate
Assume for the time being that in the rst stage, say, D1 chooses brand a and
D2 chooses to produce brand b:
2.1.1 Absence of vertical integration
Downstream Market Game When none of the rms decide to merge in the
second stage, the prot of the downstream rms, a and b; respectively, write
as
a(za;zb) = (1   za   zb)za   !aza;
b(za;zb) = (1   zb   za)zb   !bzb;
where !a and !b denote the input price paid by each rm for each input version.
The rms select the output quantities za(!a;!b) and zb(!a;!b) playing  a la
Cournot.
Upstream market game Denote by (xa;xb) the amount of input supplied
by upstream rm U1, where xa  0 is the input supplied to the downstream
D1 producing brand a, and xb  0 is the input supplied to the downstream D2.
Analogously, denote by (ya;yb) input quantities supplied by upstream rm U2,
respectively to rm D1 and rm D2 (see Fig. 1 below). It follows that the
market clearing conditions for each good are
za(!a;!b) = xa + ya;
zb(!a;!b) = xb + yb:
Using the above market clearing conditions and the rst order conditions of the
prot of downstream rms, we obtain the input demand as
!a = 1   2(xa + ya)   (xb + yb)
!b = 1    (xa + ya)   2(xb + yb)
The upstream rms select input supplies maximizing
 1 = !axa + (!b   t)xb;
 2 = !aya + (!b   t)yb:
5Figure 1: Successive markets
Solving the system of four equations of the input quantities selected by the










2   2t   
3(4   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:
The supply of input to downstream rm D2 is nonnegative for t < 1  

2:
These equilibrium quantities are substituted into the expression of za and zb,
consequently, using z
a and z
b; equilibrium output prices obtains as
p
a =
8   2 (1   t)   2




2(2t    + 4)   2 (2t + 1)
3( + 2)(2   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@ < 0: Indeed, the higher the degree of dierentiation
between brands, i.e. the lower , the higher the output price. This is the well-
known property of output prices of dierentiated goods. In contrast, for brand




6, such that for t > t0 the more
homogeneous the goods, i.e. the higher ; the higher the price pa. The intuition
for this is as follows. When the input dierence cost t becomes enough large
and exceeds threshold t0, dierentiation of brands is very costly. Therefore, in
that interval of t; the convenience to product dierentiate is less strong than the
cost to dierentiate. It follows that decreasing the rate of dierentiation does
not reduce the market power of the rm producing brand a:This property of
6Notice that t0 <
( 2)2
(2+4) is a subset of the admisible set t < 1  

2:
6output prices is the example of how the two characteristics of successive markets
interact.
The prots of downstream and upstream rms in this and the following
sections are given in the matrixes (3) and (4).
2.1.2 Vertical Integration: D1-U1
Let us now analyze the cases when one downstream rm, say D1; decides to
integrate say with U1, in the second stage game, while the other two rms oper-
ate separately. The decision to vertically integrate does not imply a priori that
the new entity does not enter the input market. In other words, we do not as-
sume input foreclosure. If it arises, it is an equilibrium foreclosure as in Gaudet
and Van Long (1996). This assumption is natural in our analysis since we ad-
dress the endogenous choice of input supplier as to what input specication to
produce.
The prot 11 of the entity composed of the downstream D1 and the up-
stream U1 writes as
11 = (1   za   zb)za + (!b   t)xb
where xb is the quantity of input supplied in the input market by the entity.
The prot of the nonintegrated downstream obtains as
2 = (1   za   zb)zb   !bzb:
Solving the system of the best replies, the quantity of output selected by each
downstream rm as a function of the input price !b is
za (!b) =




2      2!b
4   2 :
If the supply of the entity is positive, the market clearing condition in the input
market equalizes the input demand derived from the output quantity zb selected
by the downstream rm D2; and the supplied quantities of the unintegrated














Given the above input demand, the unintegrated upstream and the integrated
entity choose the quantities y
b and x
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2.1.3 Vertical Integration D2-U2
Consider now the possibility that the downstream rm D2, which needs the
costly input version, integrates with one of the upstream rms, say U2, while
the other two rms operates separately.
The entity composed of the downstream D2 and the upstream rm U2 has
as prots 22
22 = (1   za   zb)zb   tzb + !aya
The unintegrated downstream rm maximizes its prot 1;
1 = (1   za   zb)za   !aza:
They select za(!a) and zb(!a): Given the integration between the downstream
D2 and the upstream U2, the only rm demanding input in this case is the
downstream D1, thus the market clearing condition in the input market is
za(!a) = ya(!a) + xa(!a). The inverse demand function for the input is,
!a =

   t   2
2   4








The unintegrated upstream maximizes its prot  1 taking into account the
demand given above, which yields xa(ya): By substituting xa(ya) in the demand





(t      4ya + 2ya + 2):
Now, by substituting the above expressions of za;zb and !b in the prot function
of the entity we can nd the quantity of input y




t    + 2
12   32 ;
where y
a and x
a are positive in the whole range of admissible set of t:
It easy to check by dierentiating prots, that this merger is always protable
for the downstream rm, when the other two rms operate independently, but
it will not always be accepted by the upstream rm. The reason stands on the
incentive of the upstream to use its market power in the input market rather
then be a department of the downstream rm. Indeed, the cost advantage
gained by the merger by the elimination of double marginalization does not
always oset the cost advantage of downstream rm D1.
82.1.4 Full Integration
Assume now that each couple of rms integrated. In the new equilibrium two
downstream rms produce two dierentiated goods. The prots of each rm
writes simply,

11 = (1   za   zb)za;

22 = (1   za   zb)zb   tzb:
Solving a classical Cournot, we obtain the equilibrium prots for each entity
operating in downstream market.
2.2 Homogenous goods
When both downstream rms decide to produce the same output brand, at
the rst stage of the game, the model reduces to a classical successive Cournot
duopoly with linear demand. Thus, in this case, the only equilibrium of the
integration game is full integration. Indeed, in absence of dierentiation, com-
petition in the output market is ercer than in the case of two dierentiated
brands. Consequently, double marginalization internalization drives both down-
stream rms to propose a merger. Both upstream rms accept, because the
prot of the entity exceeds the standing alone prot.
3 The equilibrium of the game
The equilibrium of the game depends on dierent forces that aect rms' prots.
Firstly, (i) downstream rms decide to dierentiate to gain market power in the
downstream market. And they may vertically integrate (ii) to ensure the input
specication necessary for their brand and (iii) to increase (or to reduce) the cost
(dis)advantage with the rival rm through internalizing double marginalization.
On the other hand, the decision of upstream rms whether to accept the
merger depends on the size of double marginalization, which in turn depends
on degree of output dierentiation.
To dene the equilibrium of the game, we start with the case when down-
stream rms dierentiate. Comparing the payos, from the best replies we
obtain that rms fully integrate because integration is a dominant strategy for
U1 and D1. The best reply of the two other rms is to vertically integrate,
too7. Because of the interaction between the degree of dierentiation of brands
and the dierence in the input costs, as far as it concerns the second stage,
full integration arises because vertical externality is high enough to make the
vertical integration protable.
Combining the best response of the rms at the second stage and the rst
stage of the game, the equilibrium of the game when rms decide both whether
to integrate and to dierentiate is:
7See Appendix 1 for the full analytical derivation.
9Proposition 1 Both output brands are supplied to nal consumers by two merged
rms when the input cost is high enough (1 > t > ~ t()):Only the cheap out-
put brand is supplied by two merged rms when the input cost is low enough
(0 < t < ~ t()):
Proof. see Appendix.
It is interesting to notice that horizontal dierentiation takes place for high
input cost dierences, when rms fully integrate. While, without vertical agree-
ments, the cost to adapt the input, pushes both upstream rms to concentrate
on the basic input version. Moreover, the higher the degree of dierentiation
between output goods, the higher the incentive to produce both input versions.
Thus, if rms in the output and input market produced separately, we would
expect that at low t and ; horizontal dierentiation would takes place. And
for high t and ; only brand a would be produced. This is the contrary of what
we nd in Proposition 1. It follows that the change in market structure induced
by vertical agreements does not simply reduce or expand the set (;t) where
dierentiation occurs. Vertical agreements also change the incentives of rms
at any level of t and :
The intuition of this result depends on the size of double marginalization as
the cost t increases. Each integrated entity increases the rivals' cost as the dier-
ence in input versions increases. This leads to an increase of double marginal-
ization. Thus, when t is high, rms fully integrate to take advantage of the
elimination of the vertical externality. Moreover, this is more protable if out-
put goods are dierentiated as compared to the case of homogeneous goods.
The contrary holds when the input cost dierence t is low.
We further investigate the role of vertical integration on output brand dif-
ferentiation in the following section.
4 Vertical integration and brand dierentiation
Here, we ask what is the eect of equilibrium vertical agreements on brand
variety. To disentangle the eect of vertical integration, we rst need to know
when horizontal brand dierentiation occurs if rms do not have the option
to vertically integrate. As we said above, we expect that when rms operate
separately, then, for low  and t (high output dierentiation and low cost of
dierentiation); maximum dierentiation should occur. To verify this intuition,
we may consider the simpler two stage game: in the rst stage, rms decide what
brand to produce and in the second stage production takes place. The eect of
the vertical integration on brand dierentiation can be identied comparing the
equilibrium dierentiation of brands in the latter game with the one described
above in this paper.
Solving by backward induction, when in the rst stage downstream rms
D1 and D2 choose to produce the same brand A, the prots of the downstream
rms are equal to 0:049, and the prot of upstream rms are 0:037. If in the
rst stage rms choose two dierent brands, the payos of the game are the one
presented in the section 2.1.1.
10By the direct comparison of the solution of the two games8, it follows
Proposition 2 Vertical integration leads to a larger set of (;t) in which output
dierentiation takes place. Moreover, the sets of parameters where dierentia-
tion occurs with and without vertical integration do not intersect.
Proof. see Appendix 2.
Vertical integration allows rms to produce internally the input that is re-
quired for the output brand and moreover the corresponding cost is the marginal
cost rather that the market input price. Thus, as compared to the case of sep-
arated rms, the merged entity can produce with prots at higher input costs.
This analysis leads us to some conclusions that concern the structure of
sectors where input suppliers have exible production and brands dierentiation
depends on inputs used. We show that vertical agreements eects on horizontal
dierentiation depend on the level of input costs. When the cost to dierentiate
the input is negligible, brands are dierentiated only if rms operate separately.
As input cost dierences get higher, output brands are dierentiated, if rms
can vertically integrate.
5 Conclusion
The framework of successive markets is a natural setup to study the spillovers
induced by the strategic behavior of rms in the upstream market on the behav-
ior of rms in the downstream market and vice versa. In this paper, there exist
two brands of the output good and two possible versions of the input. Down-
stream rms select each one output brand out of two possible ones. The input
rms decide whether to produce both input versions or just the basic version
that is the less costly.
Upstream rms face the eective demand for input coming from the maxi-
mization of downstream rm prot. Consequently, the input demand embodies
how the degree of dierentiation aects the game in the downstream market. It
follows that the decision of input suppliers is driven both from the cost to adapt
the basic input, supply side, and the degree of dierentiation of output goods,
demand side. On one hand, the cost to adapt the input pushes both upstream
rms to concentrate on producing only the basic input version. While, on the
other hand, the other higher the degree of dierentiation between output goods,
higher is the incentive to produce both input versions.
8See appendix 2 for calculations.
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126 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1: The equilibrium of the game
Integration game
If in the rst stage downstream rms dierentiate, the integration game










































































We use the above matrixes of payos to identify the best replies and the
equilibria of the game.
Proof. Proposition 1
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+2)2( 2)2. Accepting such a











(+2)(2 ) hold true. When D1 and U1 integrate,












18(2 )(+2): So, the equilibrium of when
downstream rms dierentiate is full integration.
(ii) When in the rst stage of the game, downstream rms decide to produce




Int. 0:11;0:11 Int. 0:17;0:027
Not Int. 0:027;0:17 Not Int. 0:049;0:049
At the rst stage of the game, the integrated rms are better o in full in-














  + 0:472 + 0:56 + 2
2   2 = ~ t()
Hence, for 1  

2 > t > ~ t() the equilibrium of the game is full integration and
both brands are produced, while for t < ~ t() the equilibrium of the game is
full integration but only brand A is produced. This is represented in the graph
below, where ~ t() is the dash curve, while the line denes the admissible set
t < 1  

2:
Figure 2: Below the dashed curve, the equilibrium is full integration with ho-
mogenous goods. While above the dash curve, in the admissible set, the equi-
librium of the game is full integration with dierentiated brands.
6.2 Appendix 2 : Two-stage game
The game in absence of vertical integration follows two stages. In the rst stage,
rms decide what brand to produce. In the second stage, production takes place.
14Then, if in the second stage the rm do choose two dierent goods, the prot

















(+2)(2 ) : If instead, in the rst stage of
the game, both rms produce the same brand, the prot of the downstreams
are 
1 = 
2 = 0:049, while  1 =  2 = 0:037:





(+2)2( 2)2 < 0:049 if t > 0:162   0:5 + 0:33 =  t; while it is always




(+2)(2 ) > 0:037: Thus, for t >  t; downstream rms both
produce the same good A, even though the upstream rms would supply the
input version necessary to produce output brand B.
Proof. Proposition 2
The equilibrium of the game is full integration with dierentiated brands if
t > ~ t: While if rms cannot integrate both brands are dierentiated if t <  t.








)   ~ t

d = 0:3603 >
Z 1
0
 td = 0:13889
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